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Abstract
Understanding individual decisions in a world where communications and information move
instantly via cell phones and the internet, contributes to the development and implementation
of policies aimed at stopping or ameliorating the spread of diseases. In this manuscript, the
role of official social network perturbations generated by public health officials to slow down or
stop a disease outbreak are studied over distinct classes of static social networks. The dynamics
are stochastic in nature with individuals (nodes) being assigned fixed levels of education or
wealth. Nodes may change their epidemiological status from susceptible, to infected and to
recovered. Most importantly, it is assumed that when the prevalence reaches a pre-determined
threshold level, P ∗, information, called awareness in our framework, starts to spread, a process
triggered by public health authorities. Information is assumed to spread over the same static
network and whether or not one becomes a temporary informer, is a function of his/her level
of education or wealth and epidemiological status. Stochastic simulations show that threshold
selection P ∗ and the value of the average basic reproduction number impact the final epidemic
size differentially. For the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and Small-world networks, an optimal choice for P ∗
that minimize the final epidemic size can be identified under some conditions while for Scale-
free networks this is not case.
Keywords: Awareness spread, Behavior change, Outbreak and epidemic threats, Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi network, Small-world Network, Scale-free Network,
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1 Introduction
The decisions that individuals make over an epidemic outbreak depend on multiple factors. Here,
they are assumed to depend on available information, misinformation, and the income/education
of those making them [5, 9, 15, 30, 36]. There are multiple possible scenarios that consider the
decisions that individuals may make over the course of an outbreak. Individuals may modify their
behaviors in order to reduce their environmental susceptibility to a disease by washing their hands
frequently, avoiding handshakes and avoiding kissing salutes, not taking public transportation dur-
ing rush hours, using masks and more. The frequency and effectiveness of these decisions may
depend on the perceived risk of infection, a function of what each individual “knows”. In short,
individual responses to new circumstances are adaptive and may depend on real or perceive risks of
infection. Current disease prevalence, may become a marker or a tipping point, that when crossed,
triggers individual or policy decisions. Whether or not individuals follow public health officials’ rec-
ommendations may be a function of individuals’ economic/educational status. The determination
to make a drastic decision may be weakened or reinforced by each individual’s networks of friends.
Responses are altered by the opinions of work-related connections. Personal needs play a role, and
they include the need to use public transportation or the desire to attend a social event.
The landscape where behavioral decisions take place is not fixed. On the contrary, it may be
altered from within (individual decisions) or by the use of preventive or active public health policy
decisions or recommendations, some “obvious” like vaccination or quarantine, others drastic like
mandated social distancing, as in the 2009-10 flu pandemic in Mexico [14]. Now, whether the dy-
namical changes experienced by the socio-epidemiological landscape are slow or fast, will depend on
many factors. It is within this, often altered, complex adaptive dynamical system, that individual
decisions such as individually-driven social distancing, the use of face masks, frequent hand wash-
ing, increased condom use, and or the routine use of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), takes
place [39]. It has been theoretically documented [11, 12, 16, 23, 29, 37] that massive behavioral
changes can impact the patterns of infection spread, possibly playing a critical role in efforts to pre-
vent or ameliorate disease transmission. Today policies are implemented regardless of our knowledge
of who are the “drivers” responsible for inducing behavioral changes. Modeling frameworks exist
that allow for the systematic exploration of possible scenarios. Through a systematic exploratory
analyses of appropriately selected classes of scenarios, it is possible to identify possibly effective
(model-evaluated) public health policies. The use of highly detailed models including individual-
based models has some advantages since they can incorporate individuals’ awareness of risk based on
available of local information. The evaluations carried out on the effectiveness of changes, at the in-
dividual level, can be used to assess, for example, the impact of NPIs in reducing disease prevalence.
Models that couple disease dynamics and awareness to levels of infection risk have been pro-
posed. These models have been used to explore the impact of behavioral changes on the spread of
infection. In the review paper of Wang et al. [39] classify models as Rule-Based Models (RBMs),
those where individuals make their decision about changing behavior independently of others, and
Economic-Epidemiology models (EE models), that is, models where individuals change their behav-
ior in order to maximize their own utility function (what they value) subject to available resources.
The EE models account for the responses that individuals take in response to infection risks on
disease prevalence at the population level. The modeling and results reported in this manuscript
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are more closely related to those used in RBMs.
Ruled-Based Models [7, 16, 18, 23, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34] vary from compartmental ODE models
[16, 23, 37] to individual-based network models [11, 13, 22, 41]. These models have been used to
study the dynamics of highly diverse diseases including, for example, influenza and HIV [10, 31],
or in the study of generic infections [18, 23, 29, 32, 33]. Compartmental models (often using a
phenomenological approach) categories designed to capture levels of awareness of infection. Such
approach that can be used to incorporate ‘awareness’ in network models, is the objective of this
manuscript. Some models assume that “awareness” spreads along with the invading disease, that
is, through identical contact networks. Here, it is assumed that the disease and information spread
over the same social network (a drastic simplification). The possibility that awareness and responses
to the presence of a new infection among a subset of the population at risk, may significantly alter
regular temporal patterns of disease prevalence (lower highs) have been studied. Studies have also
shown that epidemic thresholds can be altered [33, 34] [29] in response to the effectiveness of NPI.
Here, the focus is on the role of policy decisions/recommendations in altering disease dynamics,
possibly the final epidemic size, within a model where awareness (generated by official actions)
spreads among those susceptible to infection and their ‘friends’.
In this paper, we explore the impact of various, prevalence-dependent pre-selected thresholds
(decisions made by public health officials) as triggers of possibly temporarily behavioral change.
The time to a triggering event is assumed to depend on the prevalence of infection– a decision
taken by health authorities (declaring some level of health emergency). We carry out simulations to
explore the impact of variations on triggering prevalence-driven levels on the final epidemic size of
a non-fatal infection under three distinct fixed artificial social structures modeled as, Erdos-Raynei,
Small-world, and Scale-free networks.
2 Modeling Framework
The model captures changing disease transmission dynamics by incorporating, after a health emer-
gency has been declared. The spread of risk information, that play by assumption over the
same social network. Risk information is transmitted at different rates depending on the eco-
nomic/education levels of individuals. We focus on single outbreaks, within a Susceptible–Infected–Recovered
(SIR) framework. The dissemination of awareness (risk information) among the susceptible popula-
tion, a process triggered by the declaration of a health emergency by the public health authorities,
generates temporary changes on the knowledge and understanding of risk of infection, thus altering
their activity and effectiveness as communicators of risk. Becoming aware of the risk of infection
and inciting our ability to communicate risk, takes place at a rate modeled as a function of the eco-
nomic/educational level of individuals in the network. Economic/educational levels are preassigned
qualities to individuals in the network from pre-selected distributions. A susceptible individual
may be a member of three sub-classes of susceptible: Unaware, Su, Aware, Sa and Indifferent,
Si. Unaware individuals that become aware of the risk of infection may (depending on their eco-
nomic/educational level), change their state to Aware, that is, be ready to convey information,
with different levels of enthusiasm, on the risks of the infection to neighbors in the network. Aware,
is assumed to be a temporary state and so a transition to the Indifferent state is included. The
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triggers that determine or drive awareness state are a function of the disease prevalence level and
not the time since start of the outbreak. The case when delays in transmitting real-time prevalence
information to public health officials takes place, the most likely scenario is not considered. How-
ever, we know that it brings additional consequences (see [38]).
The activation process of public awareness takes place within a time framework determined by
the actual (reported in general) disease prevalence and so, it is a function of the epidemic outbreak
growth rate. We let P ∗ denote the pre-selected level of prevalence identified by public health officials
as the triggering threshold after which, a public awareness process campaign is initiated via mass
media, word of mouth, social media and the like. The timing is selected when, according to public
health officials. A disease outbreak may be about to reach unacceptable levels, with P ∗, being the
pre-selected tolerance level before a health emergency is declared. The P ∗ determines the time t∗
when the information campaign starts (see Figure 1). The t∗ = t∗(P ∗) identifies the public health
system threshold that forces public health action aimed at reducing outbreak consequences. The
actual changes in behavior are determined by an stochastic process, and so, the shift in behaviors,
is a function of “chance”.
Before t∗, the dynamics are governed only by the disease transmission process. At the time
t∗, the model activates information process that models to behavioral change that reduce disease
transmission. Therefore, t∗ denotes the time when prevalence reaches P ∗ for the first time, Figure(1).
t*
P*
i (t)
No behavior
only disease 
dynamics
Behavior
disease and information
dynamics
P1
t
Figure 1: Flow diagram of the model.
Sub-section 2.1 introduces the details of our network model, starting with the network structure
and node attributes that are used to represent individuals in the network.
2.1 Network Structure
The network is denoted by G = (V,E) which includes a set N = |V| of nodes representing individ-
uals V = {i|i = 1, 2, 3, . . .N} together with a binary adjacency relation defined by the set of edges
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E = {ij|i,j = 1, 2, 3, . . .N}, where ij denotes the edge between individual (node) i and individual
(node) j. We make use of three network structures, namely, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi , Small-world, and Scale-
free networks -defined in the Appendix- as models of our social landscape, the place where infection
and awareness spread and behavioral change take place.
After generating the network [3, 8, 26], we assign some attributes to the nodes (individuals)
as follows: each node i is associated with a random variable xi ∈ [0, 1], generated from a beta-
distribution, denoting the level of education of individual i, values closer to 0 corresponding to
higher levels of education while those close to 1 indicate limited education, an individual i is as-
signed a random number from a beta distribution with shape parameters α and β.
The underlying network G is weighted, where the weight 0 < cij ≤ 1 for edge ij is the probabil-
ity, of physical contact between neighbors i and j on any specific day. We assume that the values
cij are randomly generated from a uniform distribution U [0.5, 1]. For example if cij =
5
7
, that means
that these two neighbors meet with probability 5
7
and do not meet with probability 2
7
on a specific
day. We also assume that there are no birth or deaths in the population of nodes or edges, during
the epidemic outbreak.
2.2 Dynamic of awareness among susceptible individuals
At any given time t, a person k is classified as susceptible, Sk(t), infected, Ik(t), or recovered, Rk(t),
to the disease under consideration. Disease risk awareness among susceptible individuals spreads
after public health officials make the deliberate decision to stress vigorously the risk of infection, as
it may be the case under an influenza epidemic or other health emergency. The model assumes that
the decision to promote risk prevention starts once a pre-determined prevalence level P ∗, at time
t∗, has been reached. Health authorities start to spread information about a pathogen’s outbreak,
information that gets communicated by those individuals, actively aware, in the network, with dif-
ferent degrees of efficiency. The spread of information is a function of chance (probability model)
and economical/educational level. The state of active information-communicator is assumed to be
temporary, with individuals moving into a“passive” state, indifferent, after a short period of time.
Before time t∗ every susceptible individual is unaware of the information campaigns but for times
s > t∗, members of Sk(s) may change status from unaware (S
u
k(s)) to aware (S
a
k(s)), then moving,
with some probability, into the indifferent class (Sik(s)).
We define λ˜jk as the probability that S
a
k(s) informs S
u
j (s) at time s, and causes S
u
j (s)
λ˜jk
→ Saj (s+1).
Thorough the probability γ˜k -generated from an exponential distribution with parameter γ˜, the
average awareness period is therefore 1/γ˜ days. The members of Sak(s) leave the awareness class
into indifferent class, that is, Sak(s)
γ˜k→ Sik(s+1), with probability γ˜k, after spending, on the average
1/γ˜ days in the aware class; the mean of waiting time distribution for the class Sak(s).
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2.2.1 Awareness transmission probability
λ˜jk(s) denotes the probability that an aware person S
a
k(s) will inform an unaware neighbor S
u
j (s)
at time s via their contact: λ˜jk(s) = cjkβ˜. The value cjk denotes the probability of contact between
neighbors j and k, with β˜ denoting the average probability that risk information will pass from an
aware individual to an unaware neighbor. β˜ is the average of a first increasing and then decaying
and waning function β˜(s, s∗) over the awareness period, that is, β˜ = γ˜
∫ s∗+ 1
γ˜
s∗ β˜(s, s
∗)ds, where
s∗ ≥ t∗ is the first day that a person becomes aware. β˜(s, s∗) is a function of s∗, because before
this time the person was unaware and therefore, incapable of spreading risk information. Figure
(2) helps visualize the probability function β˜(s, t∗) for t∗ = 10, a function acting on initially aware
individual, that is, individuals who became aware on the first day of awareness spread t∗. After
10 days, information enters the system, people learn that an epidemic is taking place and the risk
and severity of infection. The higher the value of P ∗ the less effective the campaign in reducing the
impact of information on the outbreak.
0 20 40 60 80
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Figure 2: Plot of the awareness probability function β˜(s, t∗) for t∗ = 10: Before day t∗ = 10
there is no awareness spread, β˜ = 0. At day t∗ = 10 initially aware individual start informing its
neighbors about infection. Through time the desire to spread information wanes [11].
3 Simulations
In this Section, we perform our analysis and simulations on three different networks: Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
random network GE , Small-world network GW , and Scale-free network GS. These networks are
defined in the appendix. To generate the networks, we use Networkx1 and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi -graph
1We use the NetworkX124 https://networkx.github.io/ open software platform to generate and analyze the
network.
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Figure 3: Flow diagram of the analogous mean-field model: The parameters λ˜, λu and λa
denote for the average force of awareness, average force of infection for unaware, indifferent and
aware individuals respectively. The parameters γ and γ˜ denote the average recovery rates from,
infection and awareness, respectively. Further, p denotes the fraction of infected population that
follow self-quarantine (Iq).
algorithm to generate GE with probability of connection p = 0.001. Using the same package, the
Watts-Strogatz algorithm is used to generate Small-world network GW with probability of rewiring
p = 0.5. We also use Barabasi–Albert’s preferential attachment model in Networkx to generate a
Scale-free network GS with degree distribution P (k) ∼ k
−2.11 [2]. The size of all networks is 10000
and the average number of neighbors for all networks is equal to 10. However, the networks differ
in terms of degree distributions and other properties due to their different structures. Simulations
start by infecting the most connected node (index case) to reach a balanced initial condition [1].
They are came out with the model baseline parameters in Table (1), unless stated otherwise.
3.1 Time series of infection
To determine the effectiveness of awareness spread, we compare the prevalence over time in the
absence and presence of awareness. Figure (4) shows the results for network structures GE , GW ,
and GS. We observe that all networks, with or without awareness, support an outbreak for the
chosen parameters (that is, the probability of extinction is low or the results are conditioned on
non-extinction). Due to a lack of epidemic threshold for Scale-free network [4, 21, 25], we always
observe an outbreak with severity that depends on the initial infected index. For the other network
structures, we observe an epidemic threshold depends on the network topology; specifically, on the
average number of neighbors and the levels of heterogeneity in the number of neighbors (mean and
variance of degree distribution) [19]. For example, for the case of Small-world networks Moore et
al. [24] derived an analytic expression for the percolation threshold pc, above which there will be
an outbreak. For the case when the network is homogeneous (Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network), the epidemic
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Parameter Description Unit Baseline
Network
Parameters
N Number of nodes in the Network People 10000
GE Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network – G(N, 0.001)
GW Small-world network – G(N, 10, 0.5)
GS Scale-free random network – P (k) ∼ k
−2.11
C¯ Average number of contact per neighbor per unit time contact/time 0.75
X(x¯) Level of education distribution (its mean) – β(5, 2)(0.7)
Infection
Parameters
β Probability of infection transmission per contact 1/contact 0.011
1/γ Average time to recover without treatment days 10
Awareness
Parameters
β˜ Average probability of awareness transmission per contact 1/contact 0.3
P ∗ Prevalence threshold 1 0.1
1/γ˜ Average time of behavior change for susceptible individuals days 7
κ Saturation factor in σ function 1 0.85
θ Parameter in which, half maximum σ function is obtained 1 0.5
x∗ Level of education threshold 1 0.4
Table 1: Parameters and their baseline values assumed for simulations, unless stated otherwise.
threshold is proportional to the average number of neighbors (average degree) [27]. Hence, for our
simulation for both networks GE and GW we approximated the basic reproduction number using
epidemic take-offs, when we had an outbreak, that is, whenever R0 > 1 ( probability of extinction
for the parameters used seemed to be negligible).
The spread of infection on Scale-free network GS is faster than for the other two network
topologies. Moreno et al. [25] , modeled infection with immunity on Scale-free and Small-world
networks, they observed that the spread of infection on Scale-free complex networks is faster than
that of Small-world networks due to a lack of epidemic threshold for network GS; large connectivity
fluctuations (heterogeneity in degree) on this network causes stronger outbreak incidence [25]. Our
result is also related to [4], in which Chowell et al. tested the severity of an outbreak using an SIR
model over a family of Small-world networks and an Scale-free network found out that the worst
case scenarios (highest infection rate) are observed in the most heterogeneous network, namely,
Scale-free networks.
The speed for infection has an impact on efficiency of awareness spread: for Scale-free network
GS awareness reduces the peak of infection by roughly 6%, but for GE and GW this reduction is
around 19%. Since in GS network infection spreads faster, hubs (individuals with many neighbors)
get infected faster and loosing the chance of transmitting or receiving awareness. Wu et al. [41]
showed a similar result: global awareness (behavior change because of higher prevalence in the
population) on Scale-free networks cannot be as effective as local awareness in reducing infection.
3.2 Initiation of awareness
The presence and spread of awareness are coupled to the presence of infection, with awareness
spreading, by design, after the infection reaches the level P ∗. Therefore, there is a time-lag between
starting time of infection and awareness spread. What should the value of P ∗ be, if the goal
is to reduce the final epidemic size? When the infection disperses fast- high basic reproduction
number- people must be informed immediately, or the policy will have no effect. As noted, there
is no threshold condition for GS network. We did not derive expressions for epidemic thresholds.
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Figure 4: Prevalence of infection versus time for three different network structure: the
curves are the mean of 100 different stochastic simulations seeding the same initial condition. The
diffusion of infection happens faster and more intense in more heterogeneous network GS, and
awareness diffusion has less impact on reducing peak of infection for GS (by 6%). For other
networks reduction of peak is by 19%.
Instead, we used epidemic take-offs to estimate the basic reproduction number as R0 = 1.8 and
2.01, numbers corresponding to GE and GS, respectively. Numbers that are not too high- such as
that of the R0 for measles [17]- we are giving awareness a chance to be effective, since an epidemic
with low R0 will reach the value P
∗ much slower.
Proceed to quantify the sensitivity of the final size of the outbreak as a function of the prevalence
threshold P ∗ over the network structures GE , GW , and GS, Figure (5), for the simulated GE
network that representing homogeneous random mixing and for the simulated GW network, we
identify an optimal point for P ∗ (the point that final size is minimized), that means awareness
spread is most effective in reducing final size for these values of P ∗. For larger values of P ∗, the
awareness policy is useless while for smaller values of P ∗ is less effective, see subfigures (5a), and
(5b).
For the simulated networks GS - in which network structure follows a power-law distribution
- we observed that the sooner awareness gets started, the smaller the total number of infected
individuals will be, see subfigures (5c) (see also [4, 25]).
To investigate the impact of awareness on the previous result and on network GE , we vary the
value of the awareness basic reproduction number R˜0 via changes in the average time of behavior
change 1/γ˜. Figure (6) shows that the value of the optimal prevalence threshold P ∗ increases as
the R˜0 increases. Accelerating awareness spread- increasing R˜0- does not seem to change final
awareness size trend (Figure (5)). Nevertheless, it makes the prevalence threshold P ∗ more effective
at reducing infection final size.
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(a) Infection final size versus prevalence threshold
for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network GE .
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.9
0.905
0.91
0.915
0.92
0.925
(b) Infection final size versus prevalence threshold
for Small-world random network GW .
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.82
0.83
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(c) Infection final size versus prevalence threshold
for Scale-free random network GS .
Figure 5: Infection Final Size Versus Prevalence Threshold: the circles are the mean of 100
stochastic simulations and error bars are 95% confidence interval. The impact of prevalence threshold on
infection final size depends on network topology. For networks GE and GW there is an optimal P
∗ to
minimize infection final size, subfigures (5a,5b). For the heterogeneous network GS the optimal point for
P ∗ disappears, subfigures (5c).
10
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
Figure 6: Infection final size versus P ∗ for different awareness R˜0 : Increasing R˜0 via
increasing the average period of awareness will make the impact of prevalence threshold on final
size stronger.
4 Discussion
We used an agent-based network model to model the spread of infection and risk information within a
population of individuals in different epidemiological states, education levels and information states.
In our model infection spreads within an SIR framework while awareness disseminates only among
susceptible individuals. Specifically, when a fraction of the infected people reaches a pre-determined
threshold, public health officials start a massive information campaign on the risk and severity of
infection. Information is transmitted by those not infected only. Awareness dynamics are triggered
by public health authorities with the objective of conveying information about risk and severity of
infection via aware susceptible individuals to unaware susceptible neighbors in the network. The
level of awareness achieved is tied in to the the educational level of each individual and the disease
prevalence. Aware susceptible individuals can become indifferent, stop propagating information on
the the risk of infection, after sometime.
Simulations of the spread of infection or awareness are carried out on different network topologies.
The patterns vary even when preserving some network properties such as the mean degree [4, 25, 35].
We simulated the spread of awareness and disease over three different network structures, namely
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi , Small world and Scale-free networks.
The results of the infection-awareness model show that Scale-free networks support a fastest
rate of infection with the impact of awareness having the lowest effect on transmission. Small-world
and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks became less effective at disease transmission, and the role of information
via aware individuals had a stronger impact in reducing transmission, Figure (4). These result are
somewhat similar to those obtained by Chowell et al. [4] and Moreno et al. [25] as they studied the
rate of infection rate of growth on an SIR model over Small-world and Scale-free networks, in the
absence of awareness. These researchers observed that the spread of infection on Scale-free complex
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networks is faster than in a Small-world one. Pastor et al. [28] and Dezso˝ et al. [6] focused on
identifying the best strategy that can be used to control (reduce) an epidemic peak on a scale-free
network. They concluded that to in order to control infection public health workers needed to
immunize the hubs at an early stage. Our results are somewhat related, that is, we find that in
order to control an infection, public health workers need to start awareness spread soon, that is,
before hubs play the role of super-spreaders.
Infection final size is a function of network topology and prevalence threshold, P ∗, and the basic
reproduction number R0. We observed that for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and Small-world networks under small
value ofR0, an optimal P
∗ can be found for which the infection final size is minimized. This optimal
point is the value that provides the best outcome under the prevalence P ∗ at the time, t∗, the time
when temporary protection was promoted by aware susceptible individuals, Figures (5a) and (5b).
For Scale-free network, for which there is no epidemic threshold, a monotonic increasing function
final size is observed, a function of the prevalence threshold P ∗, there is no optimal point P ∗ that
minimizes infection final size, Figure (5c).
Infection network and awareness network: One of the big assumptions in our model is
that the infection and awareness spread over the same network, ignoring the fact that individuals
may have multiple sources of information outside their physical contact network. In fact, we know
that information does flow through virtual neighbors such as facebook friends. How should we
incorporate the role of physical network and virtual information? We are exploring possibilities.
Static network: Again, since we are focusing on single epidemic outbreak, we have assumed
a short time frame in our simulation. We also assumed that the context network is static. The
need to extend the model to a dynamic network where individuals are allowed to change neighbors
is important in the study of disease spread over the longer time scale. The impact of awareness in
such extended model would be prone to change as well.
For sexually transmitted infections on Scale-free network [20], waiting for enough people to
become infected people before starting a campaign about risk of infection is not reasonable. For
measles in children with basic reproduction numbers very high [17], waiting to reach pre-selected
prevalence thresholds may also not be great idea. Our model results, highlight the importance of
campaigns that warns a population about the risk and severity of infection for diseases that do
not spread too fast, possibly including some flu infections or the severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS). For disease with a basic reproduction number that it is is not high [17], and assuming that
these infections spread over a random homogeneous networks such as Erdo˝s-Re´nyi , it may not be
unreasonable the existence of an optimal prevalence threshold to start and starting an awareness
dynamic campaign.
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Appendix
In this appendix, first we define some models for the network structures we used for our simulation,
then we present the pseudocode of our model.
Definition 4.1 Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network Suppose we have n disconnected nodes, and then we
make edge between two arbitrary nodes with probability p independent from every other edge. The
graph constructed via this model is called Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network G(n, p). The parameter p
in the model is a weighting function p ∈ [0, 1], where for p closer to one the generated graph is more
likely to construct graphs with more edges [8].
Definition 4.2 Small-world network Suppose we have n nodes over a ring, where each node in the
ring is connected to its k nearest neighbors in the ring. Then with probability p and independent
from any other pair of edges we select two edges i1j1 and i2j2 such that jk is from the k nearest
neighbor of ik for k = 1, 2, and rewire them. Then the constructed network is called Watts-Strogatz
Smal-world network [40] G(n, k, p).
Definition 4.3 Preferential attachment Scale-free network Suppose we want to generate a network
of n nodes. We start with one node and follow the following procedure n times: the probability of
attaching a new node to the existing ones is proportional to their current degree:
P (connect a new node i to existing node j) = deg(j)∑
k(deg(k))
, where the deg(k) is the number of neigh-
bors for node k, then with this probability we make new edge ij. The constructed network via this
model is called Barabasi–Albert Scale-free network [2]. The degree distribution of this network follows
a power-law distribution.
Now, we define assumptions and algorithm of our model. Person i at any given day t has one
of the states: Su, Sa, Si, Iq, If , or R. The fraction of infected people at dat t is P (t), and P ∗ is a
positive fraction ∈ [0, 1]. We define t∗ = mint{P (t) = P
∗} which is the first time that P (t) reaches
P ∗. We assume Education level for each person k, xk does not change by time. Also prior to time
t∗ every susceptible person is at state Su, and finally the time scale for each update is day, in which
each person can have at most one update. The following algorithms show the details.
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Notation Description
St Set of susceptible nodes at time t
Ut Set of unaware nodes at time t
At Set of aware nodes at time t
Ct Set of careless nodes at time t
It Set of infected nodes at time t
Qt Set of quarantine nodes at time t
Ft Set of free nodes at time t
Rt Set of recovered nodes at time t
G.N(k) Set of neighbors of node k in Network G
IP (k) Infection period for infected node k
AP (k) Awareness period for aware node k
ern(α) Exponential random number with average α for α > 0
urn Uniform random number in [0, 1]
ckj Probability of having contact between two neighbors k
and j
A
k
−→ B Element k moves from set A to set B
Table 2: Table of notation for a conventional network G in algorithms.
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Algorithm 1: The probability of contact per day between two neighbors: infected k and
susceptible j.
σˆk = 1∣∣∣k∈Qt ;
σj =
κxj
(θ+xj)(1+pr(t))
∣∣∣j∈At + 1
∣∣∣j/∈At ;
Σkj
def
= σˆkσj
Algorithm 2: Dynamics within a typical day t
% ==============/*Infection dynamic*/============== %;
for k∈ It do
if IP (k) = −1 then
IP (k)← max{1, ern(γ)};
else if IP (k) > 0 then
IP (k)← IP (k)− 1;
else
It
k
−→ Rt+1;
end
for j ∈ G.N(k) ∩ St do
if urn≤ βσkj(t)ckj then
St
j
−→ It+1, IP (j)← −1 ;
if xj > x
∗ then j→ Qt+1;
end
end
end
% ==============/*Awareness dynamic*/============== %;
for k∈ At do
if AP (k) = −1 then
IP(k)← max{1,ern(γ˜)};
else if AP (k) > 0 then
AP (k)← AP (k)− 1;
else
At
k
−→ Ct+1;
end
for j ∈ G.N(k) ∩ Ut do
if j is not infected next time t+ 1 and urn≤ β˜ckj then Ut
j
−→ At+1 AP (j)← −1;
end
end
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